




A GENERALIZED INDEX OF MARKET POWER 
 
 





This paper analyses two approaches to measuring market power –the commonly 
used Lerner index and a range of exploitation measures-.  It is argued that the 
Lerner index is designed to quantify market power from the supply side, and the 
exploitation measures are designed to quantify market power from the demand side, 
and that those two approaches do not always behave in a symmetric way, since 
they do not always have the same bounds.  To sort out these potentially undesirable 
properties, this paper proposes a new general index to measure market power, 
which is symmetrical in the sense that it is bounded between cero and one, 
regardless of whether the market power comes from the supply or the demand side.  
The index proposed allows for the presence of more than one firm and for the 
existence of conjectural variations. 
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Este documento analiza dos enfoques para medir poder de mercado –el 
frecuentemente utilizado índice de Lerner y un conjunto de medidas de explotación-.  
Se argumenta que el índice de Lerner está diseñado para cuantificar el poder de 
mercado por el lado de la oferta, y que las medidas de explotación están diseñadas 
para cuantificar el poder de mercado por el lado de la demanda, y que esos dos 
enfoques no siempre tienen los mismos límites.  Para corregir estas propiedades 
potencialmente no deseables, este documento propone un nuevo índice general 
para medir poder de mercado, que es simétrico -estando restringido a valores entre 
cero y uno-, independientemente de si el poder de mercado proviene del lado de la 
oferta o de la demanda.  El índice propuesto permite la presencia de más de una 
firma y la existencia de variaciones conjeturales. 
 
Palabras clave: Poder de mercado, mark up, mark down, índice de Lerner, 
medidas de explotación, organización industrial, variaciones conjeturales. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper analyses two approaches to measuring market power –the commonly used 
Lerner index and a range of exploitation measures-.  It is argued that the Lerner index is 
designed to quantify market power from the supply side, and the exploitation measures are 
designed to quantify market power from the demand side, and that those two approaches 
do not always behave in a symmetric way, since they do not always have the same 
bounds. 
 
To sort out these potentially undesirable properties, this paper proposes a new general 
index to measure market power, which is symmetrical in the sense that it is bounded 
between cero and one, regardless of whether the market power comes from the supply or 
the demand side.  The index proposed allows for the presence of more than one firm and 
for the existence of conjectural variations. 
 
The paper is organized as follows:  the next section presents a revision of some of the 
most relevant literature for the purpose at hand.  Then, the theoretical framework derives 
the Lerner index and three alternative –and related- exploitation measures, highlighting 
their main properties.  The following section proposes an index that overcomes some of 
the limitations of the above measures, describing the properties of such new index.  The 
paper ends with the main conclusions. 
 
II PREVIOUS  LITERATURE 
 
The most widely used measure of market power is the Lerner mark up index -or Lerner 










                                                           
2   This index has been criticized among others, because estimating it is complex, since it is 
difficult to obtain measures of marginal costs, and since prices may be affected by cyclical 
economic behaviour.  Thus, in general, it is useful to think of the Lerner index –and of market 




L = Lerner  index 
PG  =  Per unit price of the good analyzed 
MgC =  Marginal  cost 
 
Cabral (2000) explains how measures of market power may be required for industries and 










H L  =  Lerner index with more than one firm 
H = Herfindahl market concentration index 
η = Price elasticity of demand 
 







L =  
 
where θ is a conjectural variations coefficient, such that if: 
 
θ = 0, players play Bertrand and price equals marginal costs 
θ = 1, players play Cournot 
θ = 1/H, players play Collusion or Cartel and replicate Monopoly power   5
 









PEM  =  Pigou’s exploitation measure 
MRP  =  Marginal revenue product 
PF  =  Factor or input unit price 
 











RME  =  Rate of monopsonisitc exploitation 
 
and all the other variables are defined as before. 
 
















ε = Price elasticity of supply.   6
 
Boal and Ransom (1997) show that that index can be generalized when there is more than 









H E  =  Boal exploitation measure with more than one firm 
H = Herfindahl market concentration index 
 
Bresnahan (1989) reviews a vast literature on measuring market power, and provides a 
summary of Lerner index estimations, shown in table 1.  Note that all of the estimations 
provided in that table are between cero and one. 
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Table 1 
Summary of existing empirical work on the Lerner index 
Author Industry Lerner Index
Lopez (1984) Food Processing 0.504
Roberts (1984) Coffee roasting 0.055/0.025 (a)
Appelbaum (1982) Rubber 0.049 (c)
Appelbaum (1982) Textile 0.072 (c)
Appelbaum (1982) Electrical machinery 0.198 (c)
Appelbaum (1982) Tobacco 0.648 (c)
Porter (1983) Railroads 0.40 (b)
Slade (1987) Retail gasoline 0.1
Bresnahan (1981) Automobiles (1970s) 0.10/0.34 (d)
Suslow (1986) Aluminum (interwar) 0.59
Spiller - Favaro (1984) Banks "before" (e) 0.88/0.21 (f)
Spiller - Favaro (1984) Banks "after" (e) 0.40/0.16 (f)
a  Largest and second largest firm, respectively
b  When cartel was succeeding:  0 in reversionary periods.
c.  At sample midpoint.
d.  Varies by type of car; larger in standard, luxury segment.
e.  Uruguayan banks before and after entry deregulation
f.  Large firms /  small firms  
Source:  Bresnahan (1989) pp 1051. 
 
Boal and Ransom (1997) collect information on a range of exploitation measures, and 
express them in terms of E, the Boal exploitation measure.  Such information is 
summarized in table 2.  Note that all of the estimations provided in that table are above 
cero and eventually, larger than one. 
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Table 2 
Summary of existing empirical work on Pigou’s exploitation measure 
 
Author Industry Pigou's Exploitation Measure (a)
Scully (1974) Professional Baseball 4-7
Medoff (1976) Professional Baseball 1-2 (b)
Boyd (1994) Coal Mining (c) 0.24 (d)
Sullivan (1989)  Nurses in Hospitals 0.75-0.26 short run; close to zero long run; 
0.04-0.13 total
Hansen (1992) Nurses in Hospitals (California only)Less than 0.05
Boal (1995)  Coal Mining 0.15-0.53 short run; essentially zero in long run;
0.03-0.09 total.
Machin, Manning, and Woodland (1993) Employment by residential homes (e)0.04. 0.15 with correction for hires and quits.
Ransom (1993) Senior College teachers 5 to 18 (f)
Van den Berg and Ridder (1993) General Labour Market 0.13-0.15 (g)
Brown and Meedof (1989) General Labour Market 0.01-0.03
a.  Boal and Ransom adjust original extimates to the exploitation measure E.
b.  Data from the Reserve Clause era. The Reserve Clause is a legal clause that teams adopted, which prohibited competition
     for the hiring players between teams.
c.  From isolated Coal Mining towns
d.  Measure not significantly different from zero statistically. 
e.  Homes for the elderly in England
f.  Black and Lowenstein (1991) say Ransom’s estimates should be upper bound, because movers may be paid more than MRP.
g.  Allowing for heterogeneity among workers lower the estimations in comparison to other papers’.  
Source:  Boal and Ransom (1997). 
 
III. THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK 
 
This section derives measures of market power from profit maximization.  In order to make 
general statements, assume that there are n firms that play Cournot to start with, and keep 
in mind that this assumption will be relaxed later on, through the introduction of a 
conjectural variations coefficient. 
 
A.  Market power from the supply side 
 
When market power is generated from the supply side (with prices greater than marginal 
costs, as in monopoly, monopolistic competition and -often- oligopoly), firms apply a mark 
up.  This case is shown in figure 1. 
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Figure 1 
MARKET POWER FROM THE SUPPLY SIDE: 
MONOPOLY, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
AND -OFTEN- OLIGOPOLY 
 
 
Consider the following profit equation 
 
 




  Πi =  profits of firm i  
  PG =  Per unit price of the good produced by firm i 
  qi = quantity produced by firm i 
  Q-i =  quantity produced by all firms in the market, except firm i 
  Q = quantity produced by all firms in the market 









Mark up  10
From profit maximization with n firms, it is possible to conclude that the Lerner index with n 
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si = Market share of firm i 
η  =  Absolute value of the price elasticity of demand faced by firm i 
 
and all other variables defined as before. 
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The Lerner index can also be adapted to the conjectural variations model described in 





LH =  
 
where, as in Cabral (2000), if 
 
θ = 0, players play Bertrand and price equals marginal costs. 
θ = 1, players play Cournot 










Note also that profit maximizing firms always operate in the elastic region of the demand 
curve3. 
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Appendix 1 presents a simulation of 
θ
H L  for different values of the parameters.  In general 
the n firms Lerner index with conjectural variations, has the following properties: 
 
i.  It is designed to measure market power from the supply side 
 
ii.  It is bounded between cero and one 
 
iii.  The index is cero when there is no market power (perfect competition) 
 
                                                           









1 G P MRP , and since MgC 
≥ 0, profit maximizing firms only operate on the elastic region of the demand curve.  13
iv.  The maximum market power generates a value of one 
 
v.  The index is positively monotonic to market power 
 
B.  Market power from the demand side 
 
This section derives the Pigou index designed to measure market power from the demand 
side (with prices lower than marginal costs, as in monopsony, monopsonistic competition, 
and -often- oligopsony).  This case, where firms apply a mark down, is shown in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 
MARKET POWER FROM THE DEMAND SIDE: 
MONOPSONY, MONOPSONISTIC COMPETITION 
AND –OFTEN- OLIGOPSONY 
 
 
Consider the following profit equation 
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Mark down  14
where 
 
fi = amount of factor or input used by firm i. 
F-i =  total amount of factor or input used in the market, except for firm i. 
F = total amount of factor or input used in the market 
 
and the rest of the variables are defined as before. 
 











































































∂i = price elasticity of supply faced by firm i 
 
and all other variables are defined as before. 
 
Note that under profit maximization for a monopsonist, the marginal revenue product is 
equal to the marginal cost, and for simplicity purposes, assume that the firms are 
symmetric, and recall that by (2), s = H.  Thus, from (4) it is possible to derive the following 
measures of exploitation: 
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However, as opposed to the elasticity of demand, the elasticity of supply has the following 
characteristic4: 
 




  () 1
1 =
= ∞ → H H PEM Lim
ε
   ( ) ∞ =















ε    ( ) 2
1 1 =




  ∞ < ≤ H PEM 1  
 
                                                           






P MgC G 1 , 
profit maximizing firms can operate on the elastic and the inelastic regions of the demand 
curve.  16
Appendix 2 presents simulations of 
H PEM  for different values of the parameters.  In 
general the n firms Pigou’s exploitation measure with conjectural variations has the 
following properties: 
 
i.  It is designed to measure market power from the demand side 
 
ii.  The measure is positively monotonic to market power 
 
iii.  The measure is bounded by one when there is no market (perfect competition) 
 
iv.  The measure is unbounded as the market power rises 
 


















































H RME  for n firms can be adapted to the conjectural variations model described in 
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it follows that 
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Appendix 3 presents a simulation of 
θ
H RME  for different values of the parameters.  In 
general the n firms RME with conjectural variations has the following properties: 
 
i.  It is designed to measure market power from the demand side 
 
ii.  It is bounded between cero and one 
 
iii.  The index is positively monotonic to market power 
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iv.  The index is cero when there is no market power (perfect competition) 
 
v.  The maximum market power generates a value of one 
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This exploitation measure for n firms can be adapted to the conjectural variations model 
described in Cabral (2000), by multiplying the EH index described in (5) by the conjectural 
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  ∞ < ≤ε 0   19
 
it follows that 
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Appendix 4 presents simulations of 
θ
H E   for different values of the parameters.  In general 
the n firms Boal’s exploitation measure with conjectural variations has the following 
properties: 
 
i.  It is designed to measure market power from the demand side 
 
ii.  The index is positively monotonic to market power 
 
iii.  The index is bounded by cero when there is no market power (perfect competition) 
 
iv.  The index is unbounded as the market power rises 
 
Thus, there is an asymmetry between the Lerner index and the exploitation measures 
analyzed used in the literature, since the Lerner index is designed to measure market 
power from the supply side, while the exploitation measures are designed to quantify 
market power from the demand side, and besides, the Lerner index is bounded for both 
increases and decreases in market power, while the exploitation measures are not always 
bounded for increases in market power. 
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IV.  THE GENERALIZED INDEX OF MARKET POWER 
 
To sort out the potentially undesirable asymmetries of the Lerner index and the 
exploitation measures, this paper proposes a Generalized Index of Market Power GIMP, 
which is symmetrical and bounded between cero and one, regardless of whether the 
market power comes from the supply or the demand side.  The index proposed is: 
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P = PG if market power comes from the supply side (P > MgC) 
P = PF if market power comes from the demand side (P < MgC). 
 
When market power comes from the supply side, price is greater than the marginal cost 











Thus, the microeconomic derivation and the properties of the GIMP when market power 
comes from the supply side, are the same as those of the Lerner index.  Besides, the 
GIMP with n firms and conjectural variations can be expressed as 
θ
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This implies that the simulations reported in Appendix 1 apply to both the Lerner index and 
the 
θ
) (H SS GIMP . 
 
When market power increases from the demand side, price is lower than marginal cost, 











The microeconomic derivation and the properties of the GIMP when market power comes 
from the demand side, are the same as those of Scully’s rate of monopsonistic exploitation 
RME.  Thus, the GIMPDD with n firms and conjectural variations can be expressed as 
θ
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All of the above implies that the simulations reported in Appendix 3 apply to both Scully’s 
RME and the 
θ
) (H DD GIMP . 
 
In general the n firms GIMP index with conjectural variations has the following properties:  
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i.  It is designed to measure market power from supply or demand 
 
ii.  It is bounded between cero and one 
 
iii.  The index is positively monotonic to market power 
 
iv.  The index is cero when there is no market power (perfect competition) 
 
v.  The maximum market power generates a value of one 
 
A summary of the features of the market power measures analyzed in this paper is 
presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Key features of the Market Power Measures Analyzed 
 
Type of  Lower bound Upper bound Source of Market
Monotonicity as market power as market power Power measured
Increased Market  falls increase
Index power from supply
Lerner Positive 0 1 Supply
Pigou Positive 1 Unbounded Demand
Scully Positive 0 1 Demand
Boal Positive 0 Unbounded Demand




This paper has analysed two approaches to measuring market power –the commonly used 
Lerner index and a range of exploitation measures-.  It has argued that the Lerner index is 
designed to quantify market power from the supply side, while the exploitation measures 
are designed to quantify market power from the demand side, and that those two 
approaches do not always behave in a symmetric way, since they do not have the same 
bounds. 
  23
To sort out these potentially undesirable properties, a new general index to measure 
market power has been proposed, which is symmetrical in the sense that it is bounded 
between cero and one, regardless of whether the market power comes from the supply or 
the demand side.  Besides, the index proposed has been extended to be used when there 
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